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ABSTRACT. This article examines whether the likeli-
hood and amount of firm charitable giving in response to
catastrophic events are related to firm advertising inten-
sity, and whether industry competition level moderates
this relationship. Using data on Chinese firms’ philan-
thropic response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, we find
that firm advertising intensity is positively associated with
both the probability and the amount of corporate giving.
The results also indicate that this positive advertising
intensity-philanthropic giving relationship is stronger in
competitive industries, and firms in competitive industries
are more likely to donate. This study thus provides evi-
dence suggesting that even in the wake of catastrophic
events, corporate philanthropic giving is strategic.
KEY WORDS: advertising intensity, catastrophic events,
corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility,
industry competition level
Introduction
Recent catastrophic events, such as the 9/11 New
York terrorist attacks in 2001, the South Asian tsu-
nami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina in the
southern U.S. in August 2005, the Kashmiri earth-
quake in October 2005, and China’s Sichuan
earthquake in May 2008 were all devastating and
spurred philanthropic actions by individuals, cor-
porations, nongovernmental organizations, and
government agencies. In particular, many companies
responded by giving donations (e.g., cash, goods,
and employee voluntary efforts) as part of their
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Carroll (1979)
argues that CSR has four intimately related facets –
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic –
with organizations striving to achieve all the four
simultaneously. On the bases of these components, a
socially responsible firm ‘‘should strive to make a
profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good
corporate citizen’’ (Carroll, 1991, p. 43).
This research focuses on one special class of CSR –
corporate philanthropic giving (CPG). Although
corporate philanthropic response is not enforced as
are economic and legal responsibilities, it is increas-
ingly practiced by companies and is generally viewed
as a sign of good corporate citizenship. Previous
research (e.g., Chapple and Moon, 2005; Katz et al.,
2001; Kolk, 2005; Muller and Whiteman, 2009;
Shen, 2004; Welford, 2005) suggests that companies
worldwide react and respond differently to natural
disasters, and their philanthropic donations can be
motivated by a variety of factors, including cultural,
institutional (e.g., stakeholder configurations), orga-
nizational, economic, and geographic. The motiva-
tion for corporate giving is not inherently altruistic.
Corporate giving is a reaction to seismic shifts in the
environmental landscape, and it represents a reactive
strategy crafted to counter pressures such as stake-
holder demands, threats of government intrusion into
industry’s freedom, and escalating public expectations
(Campbell et al., 1999; Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006;
Patten, 2008).
In today’s global business, CPG is becoming more
strategic, as has been indicated by Brammer and
Millington (2006), Saiia (2002), and Sa´nchez (2000).
Ever-increasing global competition requires that
firms establish their competitive advantage from
various sources. Corporate philanthropy may help a
firm establish reputation, brand recognition, and
loyalty; promote itself as a ‘‘socially responsible’’ firm,
or attract and maintain a work force (Sa´nchez, 2000).
Dean (2003) finds that corporate donations can help
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the company forge a relationship with the customer
and build loyalty. From a marketing perspective, it is
also common for companies to invest in advertising to
achieve the common goals of building stronger rela-
tionships with customers and enhancing customer
loyalty (Dick and Basu, 1994). For example, adver-
tising influences the attitude–behavior relationship
through its impact on accessibility (Berger and
Mitchell, 1989). The underlying mechanism may be
explained as follows: repeated advertising exposure
can potentially enhance consumers’ confidence by
allowing them to process more information, repeat-
ing attitudinal decisions, and providing more oppor-
tunities for brand-relevant cognitive elaboration
(Berger and Mitchell, 1989; Oliver, 1999). As in most
cases both corporate philanthropy and advertising
serve the common purpose of building customer
loyalty, we predict that firms with large advertising
expenses will tend to have higher likelihood of giving
and to donate larger amounts.
The relationships between advertising expenses
and philanthropy in different industries are not
actually the same. Amato and Amato (2007) find that
industry effects explain between 20 and 22% of the
total variation in donation ratios of the firms. Peer
pressure may create an environment that requires
firms to meet or exceed competitor philanthropy to
maintain customer and community goodwill. In this
study, we investigated whether charitable donation
amounts and the likelihood of firm response to
catastrophic events relate to firm advertising inten-
sity, and how this relationship varies with industry
competition levels, a topic that has not been previ-
ously discussed in the CPG literature.1
The context of our study is the Sichuan earthquake
in China, which took place in May 2008. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that Chinese companies quickly
and effectively responded to the call for donations and
disaster response efforts, and that corporate donations
were significant. We identified 703 Chinese listed
firms that engaged in CPG through outright cash
donations and/or in-kind donations with the value
released by the donor firm in May and June 2008. We
find that the likelihood and extent of corporate
contributions are positively related to firms’ adver-
tising intensity. We also document the moderating
effect of industry competition level on the relation-
ship: the positive relationship between CPG and
advertising intensity is significantly strengthened in
more competitive industries. Our findings are robust
when we use a different measure of competition levels
or examine only firms that made donations. Besides
that, the decision to engage in CPG and the amount
of donations are positively associated with firm size,
profitability, and cash available. Geographic location
(in the earthquake province) is positively related to
firm total donation amount. The decision to engage
in CPG is negatively correlated with firm leverage.
Results suggest that CPG decisions and the extent of
donations are significantly influenced by industry
type, substantially motivated by strategic consider-
ation, and greatly constrained by economic factors in
emerging markets such as China.
This study contributes to the literature in several
ways. First, using a unique research setting provided
by the Sichuan earthquake, we investigate the link
between CPG and advertising intensity. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study
explicitly addressing such an association. Second, we
provide evidence of positive association between
advertising intensity and CPG. We also find a medi-
ating effect of industry competition on this relation-
ship. These findings are consistent with previous
research in that CSR activities are driven by strategic
motivation and constrained by economic consider-
ations. Our results add to our understanding of the
motivations behind CPG and carry important
implications for practice. Third, we contribute to the
literature on sustainability, performance, and CSR by
investigating the association between corporate
philanthropy (donations) and firm characteristics.
Finally, while the issue of CPG has attracted growing
research interest in recent years, most empirical results
are based on U.S. data, and this article is one of the few
empirical studies in emerging markets using a large
research sample. This article adds to a growing
number of non-U.S. studies by investigating the link
between firm advertising and CPG in China, the
largest developing economy in the world.
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows: the ‘‘Background and hypotheses develop-
ment’’ section provides institutional background, the
literature review, and research questions. The
‘‘Sample and descriptive analysis’’ section discusses
data collection and methods. The ‘‘Empirical
results’’ section presents the results, and the ‘‘Dis-
cussion and conclusion’’ section concludes,
suggesting implications of the study.
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Background and hypotheses development
Background
The 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which registered 8.0
on the Richter scale, occurred on the afternoon of
May 12, 2008.2 As of September 11, 2008, official
figures stated that 69,226 people were confirmed
dead and 374,643 injured; 17,923 were still listed as
missing (Xinhua Net, 2008a). Approximately 45.5
million people lived in the affected area (Xinhua
Net, 2008b). The earthquake left about 4.8 million
people homeless, though the number could be as
high as 11 million (Hooker, 2008). It was both the
strongest and the deadliest earthquake to hit China
since the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, which
claimed the lives of at least 240,000 (Spignesi,
2005). The direct economic loss is estimated as
high as 123 billion U.S. dollars (Shanghai Daily,
2008).
Research indicates that climate-related natural
disasters such as hurricanes will likely increase
(Emanuel, 2005; Webster et al., 2005), and the
aggregate social and economic costs of such events
have been rising steadily since the 1960s (Muller and
Whiteman, 2009). This increasing propensity to
natural disasters calls for more financial and social
disaster relief efforts by the government, individuals,
and corporations in the future. As Muller and
Whiteman (2009) suggest, such corporate activities
include donations in cash and in kind, as well as
employee volunteer jobs. In recent years, with the
economic development of emerging markets, listed
firms in those markets have been more and more
involved in corporate social activities. After the 5/12
Sichuan earthquake, almost half of the firms listed on
the Chinese stock market made relief efforts.3
According to the Deputy Secretary-General of the
China Charity Foundation (CCF), both the number
of companies participating and the size of the gifts
were extraordinary (Wang, 2008).
Motivations for CPG
The motivations for CPG have been documented
extensively in the literature (Brammer and Milling-
ton, 2005, 2006; Campbell et al., 2002; Saiia et al.,
2003; Seifert et al., 2003). Campbell et al. (2002) and
Seifert et al. (2003) provide comprehensive outlines
of empirical research studies, critiques, and reviews
that have examined motivations for CPG. Speaking
in general, the literature suggests four possible
motivations for CPG: strategic, political, altruistic,
and managerial utility.
Strategic motivations
Saiia et al. (2003, p. 170) define strategic philan-
thropy as the practice of ‘‘giving of corporate
resources to address non-business community issues
that also benefit the firm’s strategic position and,
ultimately, its bottom line.’’ According to this defi-
nition, firms ‘‘do good in order to do well,’’ and
corporate philanthropy appears to be consistent with
the concept of the profit-maximizing model of a
business. Hess et al. (2002), Smith and Stodghill
(1994), and Vidaver-Cohen and Altman (2000)
argue that firm philanthropic activities are a
good market-entry strategy for global expansion.
Governments typically encourage donations by
individuals and corporations for public goods
through tax incentives, and companies often incor-
porate such incentives into their strategic decision to
engage in CPG.
Political motivations
As Sa´nchez (2000) states, the political perspective is
also strategically motivated. This view posits that
firms engage in philanthropy to maximize benefits,
but not in the form of an economic return on
investment (ROI). Rather, philanthropy is used to
maximize a firm’s political ROI. Corporate philan-
thropy builds image and furthers corporate political
interests ‘‘for the purpose of securing rewards and
reducing penalties from significant external publics’’
(Neiheisel, 1994, p. 42). Community recognition
for CSR is important to corporations with local
community roots, particularly for non-state-owned
corporations to build political ties.
Altruistic motivations
Some scholars view corporate philanthropy as a
practice of good citizenship, an obligation to maxi-
mize public welfare, and giving with nothing
expected in return; thus, they interpret corporate
philanthropy as altruism (Campbell et al., 1999;
Cowton, 1987; Shaw and Post, 1993).
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Managerial utility motivations
This view uses agency theory (deeply rooted in
economic literature and developed in finance liter-
ature) to explain motivations for CPG. From an
agency theory perspective, scholars argue that cor-
porate philanthropy is likely to enhance the CEO’s
self-interests, but unlikely to maximize shareholder
wealth (e.g., Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988).
Corporate philanthropy is viewed as an attempt by
executives to enhance their social standing in the
community, self-image, or personal prestige at the
expense of the company (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Haley,
1991).
One notable trend of CPG is that corporate
charity giving is becoming more strategic, as indi-
cated by Brammer and Millington (2006), Saiia
(2002), and Sa´nchez (2000). In recent years,
increased global competition has required that firms
establish their competitive advantage from various
sources. Corporate philanthropy may help a firm
establish brand recognition and loyalty, promote it-
self as a ‘‘socially responsible’’ firm, or attract and
maintain a work force (Sa´nchez, 2000). As Brammer
and Millington (2006) suggest, strategy plays a sig-
nificant role in determining how firms manage their
philanthropy. Our study thus focuses on the strategic
motives for giving and its relationship with firm
advertising intensity, while taking into account
industry competition level.
CPG and firm characteristics
Numerous studies have documented firm charac-
teristics that affect donation decisions, i.e., whether
or not to donate, and the amount of donations
(Brammer and Millington, 2004, 2005; Campbell
and Slack, 2006; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Wang
and Coffey, 1992). Speaking in general, firm size,
profitability, cash resources available, geography,
leverage, and industry have been found to be
correlated with firm CPG decision and amount.
Firm size, reflecting and embodying a diverse
range of firm attributes, has been documented to be
positively correlated to CPG decision and donation
amount (Amato and Amato, 2007; Brammer and
Millington, 2006; Muller and Whiteman, 2009).
Economic causes for this correlation might include
large firms’ greater absolute levels of resources,
possible economies of scale in CSR activities,
and the fact that larger firms are likely to be more
mature and, therefore, are unlikely to face a signif-
icant number of attractive alternative investments
(Orlitzky, 2001).
Profitability and cash resources available have also
been found to be positively related to CPG (Adams
and Hardwick, 1998; Crampton and Patten, 2008;
Galaskiewicz, 1997; Useem, 1988). Useem (1988,
p.78) argues that ‘‘the single most important market
factor underlying corporate giving is the traditional
measure of company success, its net income.’’
Crampton and Patten (2008) find that differences
in the extent of corporate giving following the
9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 were positively and
significantly associated with differences in firm
profitability. The other measure of firm resources is
cash available. Seifert et al. (2003) show a positive
relationship between a firm’s available cash resources
and cash donations.
Geography could be another factor that affects
firms’ CPG decisions and variations in donation
amounts. Muller and Whiteman (2009) find a ‘‘home
region effect’’ and a ‘‘local presence effect’’ in CPG:
firms are more attentive to disasters that are closer to
home or in areas where they have a local presence.
Previous studies have found that leverage is neg-
atively related to CPG, as firm donation is restricted
by resources available and firms with more debt have
more pressure to pay off their debt, which reduces
available resources. Adams and Hardwick (1998)
find that the decision to contribute is negatively
related to leverage, and Brammer and Millington
(2005) show that among givers, the rate of giving is
related negatively to firm indebtedness.
CPG, advertising intensity, and industry competition
level: hypothesis development
According to Nelson’s (1970, 1974) view, advertis-
ing provides consumers with information to distin-
guish among different kinds of products. In order to
successfully differentiate from their counterparts,
firms may invest more in advertising. McWilliams
and Siegel (2001) suggest that companies can also
adopt CSR as a differentiation strategy because CSR
helps a firm to build its reputation as being reliable
and honest. Indeed, studies show that consumers
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assume the products of a reliable and honest firm will
be of high quality (Brammer and Millington, 2005;
Fisman et al., 2006). A survey of 463 U.S. companies
found that companies taking a more businesslike
approach to charity reported a better image, increased
employee loyalty, and improved customer ties
(Schwartz and Smart, 1995). Another survey by
Walker Information Inc., a research and consulting
company that tracks customer satisfaction and busi-
ness ethics, found that 47 percent of consumers would
be more likely to buy from a ‘‘good’’ company that
was socially responsible (Sato, 1998).
Prior literature has documented the relationship
between advertising and provision of CSR. Navarro
(1988) concludes that firms that spend more on
advertising tend to give more to charity. McWil-
liams and Siegel (2000) find that advertising is an
element of a differentiation strategy, and it is posi-
tively correlated with corporate social performance.
Fisman et al. (2006) find that CSR is more prevalent
in advertising-intensive (consumer-oriented) indus-
tries. Brown et al. (2006) support the theory that
charitable giving enhances shareholder value, and
within an industry, advertising intensity is positively
related to companies’ giving.
As a special class of CSR, CPG is also similar to
other classes of CSR. For example, Crampton and
Patten (2008) find that CPG is constrained by similar
economic concerns. We posit that firms view CPG
strategically, and firms with more market investments
are more likely to give and give more in response to
the Sichuan earthquake. Accordingly, we hypothesize
that
H1: There is a positive relation between CPG
and the extent of advertising intensity.
Previous research also indicates that industry com-
petition influences CSR. For example, Fernandez-
Kranz and Santalo (2004) provide evidence that
product market competition is positively associated
with widely used CSR measures. Their estimates
suggest that if all else were constant, doubling the level
of competition in the marketplace would increase the
CSR ratings of an average company by almost 2–8
times. Fisman et al. (2006) find that CSR expendi-
tures are more positively correlated with profits in
more competitive industries, owing to the greater
signal value of such expenditures in competitive
environments. Neville et al. (2005) show that the
positive relationship between corporate reputation
and a firm’s financial performance strengthens as
competitive intensity increases. Thus, a firm in a
highly competitive industry should have more
incentives to use CSR to differentiate itself from its
competitors. Accordingly, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2: The positive relation between CPG and
advertising intensity is stronger for more
competitive industries.
Sample and descriptive analysis
In order to explore the potential relationship between
CPG and advertising intensity, and the moderating
effects of industry competition level, we collected
data on donation amounts and donation characteris-
tics for all companies listed on the Chinese stock
market. In accordance with previous research (e.g.,
Muller and Whiteman, 2009), our investigation is
based on firm self-reporting and draws from infor-
mation disseminated through the official information
disclosure website appointed by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), corporate web-
sites and press releases, and information located by
search queries via Lexis Nexis China and Google
China News.4 We conducted our search in the period
of May–June 2008, as the requirement for a dated
press release increases the likelihood that the con-
tributing firm is seeking strategic value for its giving
(Patten, 2008).
In total, we identified 703 companies, about 47%
of the total number of firms listed in the Chinese
stock market, with an earthquake relief-oriented
press release issued within the time frame of interest.
We measured corporate contributions as (1) outright
cash donations and/or (2) in-kind donations with
the value released by the donation firm. The an-
nounced contributions for the 703 firms ranged from
8,000 Yuan to 60,210,000 Yuan with a mean
(median) of 3,086,688 (1,001,000) Yuan. Similar to
Tian and Estrin (2008), we obtained our firm
financial data from the Peking University CCER
Sinofin database. Eighteen firms had missing financial
data, which reduced our giver sample size to 685
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firms. Those firms are distributed in almost all kinds of
industries, and are mixed B2C (Business to Cus-
tomer), B2B (Business to Business), and B2G (Busi-
ness to Government). According to Tian and Estrin
(2008) Table II, only 5.1% of firms listed in China are
owned by foreign investors; the rest are Chinese
firms, owned by family, other domestic industry,
financial companies, or the Chinese government.
Descriptive statistics and variable correlations
Table I provides the descriptive statistics of the
financial, advertising, and industry competition
characteristics for 1,479 listed firms in the sample
(including 685 givers and 794 nongivers) and also
the comparison of those characteristics for firms in
highly competitive industries versus firms in less
competitive industries. We use the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure for industry
competition. HHI is a well-accepted measurement
of industry competition in economics, calculated by
squaring the market share of each firm competing in
the industry and then summing the resulting num-
bers. A high HHI represents low competition.
Industry is based on the classification provided by
the CSRC. We divide the whole sample into two
subsamples: firms in industries with HHI‡ 0.1 (or
HHID [the HHI dummy variable] = 0) are classified
in the low competition group, and firms in industries
with HHI < 0.1 (or HHID = 1) are deemed to be
in highly competitive industries. We use t-tests to
TABLE I
Descriptive statistics
Mean SD HHID = 1 HHID = 0 t-test for the difference between observations
in the HHID = 1 and the HHID = 0 groups
1. Donation 144.12 398.62 141.87 157.96 -0.51
2. Donation dummy 0.463 0.499 0.467 0.440 0.93
3. Advert 0.036 0.055 0.037 0.030 1.99**
4. HHI 0.060 0.103 0.030 0.249 -18.39***
5. Size 21.43 1.225 21.45 21.35 0.92
6. ROA 0.042 0.115 0.046 0.068 -1.74*
7. Sichuan dummy 0.058 0.237 0.059 0.058 0.10
8. Cash available 785.59 3488.56 635.69 1706.7 -4.12***
9. Leverage 0.559 0.498 0.541 0.673 -3.55***
Number of firms 1,272 207
Variable Definitions
Donation: total amount of cash and in-kind donation of firms.
Donation dummy: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm contributes to earthquake relief and 0 otherwise.
Advert: the measure of firms’ advertising intensity: it equals firms’ selling expense divided by beginning of the year total
assets.
HHI: the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for each industry. Industry is based on the classification used by the CSRC.
HHI ¼P ni¼1ðXi=XÞ2, where Xi is the sales revenue of firm i in the industry, X is the total sales revenue for all firms in
the industry, and n is the number of firms. Lower value of HHI indicates higher competition.
HHID: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in an industry with HHI < 0.1, and 0 otherwise. Thus,
firms in the HHID = 1 group are in relatively high-competition industries and firms in the HHID = 0 group are in
relatively low-competition industries.
Size: log form of total assets in the 2007 annual report.
ROA: net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
Sichuan dummy = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i is in Sichuan province and 0 otherwise.
Cash available: cash and cash equivalents in the 2007 annual report.
Leverage: total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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examine the differences across the two subsamples.5
The mean of the advertising expense for the low
HHI subsample (0.037), or firms in more competi-
tive industries, is significantly higher than that for the
high HHI subsample (0.030), or firms in less com-
petitive industries (p < .05). This shows that firms in
more competitive industries spend more on adver-
tising than firms in less competitive industries. The
average HHI for the HHID = 1 group of firms is
0.030, versus 0.249 for the HHID = 0 group of
firms. Firms in more and less competitive industries
do not differ in size. In less competitive industries,
firms enjoy higher ROA (return on assets) and more
cash available, which is consistent with the eco-
nomic theory that firms in more competitive
industries are less profitable. Almost 5.8% of firms in
our sample are located in Sichuan province, and the
composition in terms of Sichuan firms and non-
Sichuan firms does not differ for high and low HHI
groups. The average leverage ratio, defined as total
debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the
year, is 0.559, and firms in less competitive industries
seem to have relatively more debt than firms in more
competitive industries. The significant differences in
advertising expense, ROA, cash resources available,
and leverage emphasize the importance of control-
ling for these variables when modeling the rela-
tionship between firm advertising intensity, industry
competition level, and CPG.6
Table II presents Pearson correlations between
dependent and various independent variables in our
model. The variable donation, which includes both
cash and in-kind donations, is positively related with
firm size, ROA, and cash available. This is consistent
with the literature and our conjecture that larger, more
profitable firms and firms with more cash resources
available donate more than other firms. The donation
dummy is positively related to firm advertising
intensity, size, ROA, and cash available, and nega-
tively related to HHI and leverage. On the one hand,
this is consistent with our main expectation that firms
spend more on advertising and firms in competitive
industries are more likely to donate. On the other
hand, this also indicates that larger, more profitable
firms, as well as firms with more cash resources, are
more likely to be involved in CPG activities, and firms
with more debt are less likely to donate after the cat-
astrophic event. Firm advertising intensity is negatively
related to HHI, which is consistent with our previous
finding that firms in more competitive industries spend
more on advertising. HHI is positively related to ROA
and cash available, which indicates that firms in less
competitive industries are more profitable.
Empirical results
Advertising intensity, industry competition level,
and donation likelihood
Although preliminary evidence suggests that firms
with high advertising intensity and firms in highly
TABLE II
Variable correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Donation 1.000
2. Donation dummy 0.389* 1.000
3. Advert 0.078* 0.152* 1.000
4. HHI 0.067* -0.021 -0.111* 1.000
5. Size 0.396* 0.209* -0.085* 0.165* 1.000
6. ROA 0.087* 0.064* 0.006 0.059* 0.056* 1.000
7. Sichuan dummy 0.018 -0.021 -0.004 -0.013 -0.075* 0.002 1.000
8. Cash available 0.364* 0.120* -0.051* 0.237* 0.425 0.053* -0.028 1.000
9. Leverage -0.034 -0.090* -0.033 0.029 -0.123* -0.131* 0.039 -0.020
Variable Definitions
Please refer to Table I for variable definitions.
*p < 0.01.
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competitive industries are more likely to donate,
other factors also have important effects on the
decision about CPG, such as firm size (Adams and
Hardwick, 1998; Waddock and Graves, 1997),
profitability (McGuire et al., 1988; Seifert et al.,
2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997), cash resources
available (Seifert et al., 2003), geographic location
(Muller and Whiteman, 2009), leverage ratio
(Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Brammer and Mil-
lington, 2005), and industry (Amato and Amato,
2007; Seifert et al., 2003; Useem, 1988). Thus, in
order to formally investigate our research questions,
we employ the logistic regression model in equation
(1) to test the relation between CPG decisions and
firm advertising intensity, and the moderating effects
of industry competition level.
Donation dummyi ¼ k0 þ k1 Adverti
þ k2 HHI ðHHIDÞi þ k3 Advert  HHI ðHHIDÞi
þ k4 Sizei þ k5 ROAi þ k6 Sichuan dummyi
þ k7 Cash availablei þ k8 Leverage þ di ð1Þ
Table III shows the results of the logistic regression
models. We use two industry competition variables,
the original HHI and HHID, the HHI dummy
variable, to capture the effect of industry competi-
tion level on firm CPG behavior. The Cox & Snell
and Nagelkerke pseudo R2 values, developed to
approximate OLS-type R-square functions, show
that both models capture a good proportion of the
variance in the data. In both regressions, the coef-
ficients of advertising intensity are significantly
positive (p < .01). These results are consistent with
our expectations that firms with higher advertising
expenses are more likely to donate in response to the
Sichuan earthquake. The coefficient of HHI is
negative and significant, which indicates that firms in
more competitive industries are more likely to
donate.
Firm size is positively related to firm donation
dummies, showing that large firms are more likely to
donate after catastrophic events. This is consistent
with Brammer and Millington’s assertion that large
firms are more visible to the public and they may
have greater incentives to donate to increase firm
reputation. Firm cash resources available are also
positively related to firm donation decisions, in line
with the finding in the literature that firms with
higher cash resources are more likely to be involved
in CPG activities (Crampton and Patten, 2008;
Seifert et al., 2003). The coefficient of ROA is
positive but not significant; this is not consistent
with our expectation that more profitable firms are
more likely to donate (Useem, 1988). Leverage is
found to be negatively correlated to firm CPG
decisions, and this demonstrates, once again, what
Adams and Hardwick (1998) found, that the deci-
sion to contribute is negatively related to leverage, as
heavily indebted firms may face more pressure to pay
off debts and thus may have fewer resources to
donate.
Advertising intensity, industry competition level,
and donation amount
While equation (1) tests the likelihood of firms
donating, in this section, we are interested in seeing
whether the same independent variables influence
the donation amount. Specifically, we examine the
relationships of firm advertising intensity, industry
competition level, and CPG amount in a more
comprehensive view by considering other factors
that may affect firm donation amount. Our regres-
sion model is illustrated in equation (2).
Donationi ¼ b0 þ b1 Adverti þ b2 HHI ðHHIDÞi
þ b3 Advert  HHI ðHHIDÞi þ b4 Sizei
þ b5 ROAi þ b6 Sichuan dummyi
þ b7 Cash availablei þ b8 Leverage þ ei ð2Þ
Table IV presents the results of the multiple
regression analysis of equation (2), where the cor-
porate giving measure is the total value of donations,
including both cash and in-kind donations. As noted
in the table, both models are highly significant (based
on the model F-statistics) with adjusted R2s of 0.223
and 0.224. The coefficient on Advert in Reg1 is
positive and significant, which indicates that the
advertising intensity is positively associated with
donation amount in response to the Sichuan earth-
quake. The result confirms our hypothesis 1. The
interaction ‘‘Advert  HHI’’ is negatively associated
with differences in the extent of charitable giving in
response to the Sichuan earthquake (p < .05). This
result is consistent with our expectation that the
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positive relationship between advertising intensity
and philanthropic giving is stronger in highly com-
petitive industries. We also use HHID to replace
HHI, and get similar results. The interaction
‘‘Advert  HHID’’ is significantly positive, which
supports hypothesis 2.
In accordance with previous findings in the
literature, firm size is positively correlated with the
total amount of giving. Firm profitability and cash
resources available are positively related to firm
donation amount, suggesting that even in times of
heightened social pressure following catastrophic
events, corporate philanthropy is constrained by
economic concerns (Crampton and Patten, 2008).
The Sichuan dummy is positively related to firm
total donation, indicating that, as Muller and
Whiteman (2009) suggest, there are home-, region-,
and local-presence effects on CPG activities. Firms
in Sichuan province donate more in total than firms
located in other provinces after other factors that
affect donation amount are controlled. Leverage is
not significant in either of the two models, even
though previous studies show that the extent of
giving is negatively associated with firm leverage
(Brammer and Millington, 2005).
Further analysis – givers only
Crampton and Patten (2008) suggest that including
zero-Yuan givers may cause potential bias. In order
to verify the robustness of our results, we repeated
our regression analyses of equation (2) using sample
firms with actual philanthropic giving in response to
the Sichuan earthquake, following Crampton and
Patten’s (2008) procedure. Thus, we separate the
choice of how much to donate from the choice of
whether to make a contribution.
TABLE III
Logistic regression for the likelihood of firm donation
Donation dummyi ¼ k0 þ k1 Adverti þ k2 HHI ðHHIDÞi þ k3 Advert  HHI ðHHIDÞi
þ k4 Sizei þ k5 ROAi þ k6 Sichuan dummyi þ k7 Cash availablei þ k8 Leverage þ di
(1)
Reg1 Reg2
Model explanatory power
Number of observations 1,479 1,479
-2 Log likelihood 1891.88 1895.98
Cox & Snell R2 0.093 0.090
Nagelkerke R2 0.124 0.121
Variables Parameter estimate Wald Parameter estimate Wald
Intercept -5.433*** 14.63 -5.448*** 14.84
Advert 7.598*** 32.93 7.836*** 34.96
HHI -1.19** 4.31
Advert*HHI -24.29 1.52
HHID -0.028 0.018
Advert*HHID 3.78 0.87
Size 0.238*** 12.28 0.238*** 12.37
ROA 0.685 1.57 0.631 1.34
Sichuan dummy -0.013 0.003 -0.013 0.003
Cash available 0.0003** 9.54 0.0003** 8.39
Leverage -0.554*** 6.50 -0.565*** 6.76
Please refer to Table I for variable definitions.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table V presents the results with actual firm
donors only, and the results are quite similar to those
in Table IV. Advert is significantly positive in
Regression 1 (Reg1), in accord with our hypothesis
1. The interaction terms ‘‘Advert  HHI’’ and
‘‘Advert HHID’’ are significant, with a t-statistic of
-1.77 and 2.39, respectively, in accordance with
hypothesis 2. Other economic factors also have
coefficients similar to those in previous tables. These
additional tests further confirm our hypotheses.
Discussion and conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between
CPG and advertising intensity across different
industries. Using data on Chinese firms’ philan-
thropic response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake,
we find that the probability and amount of charitable
giving are positively associated with firms’ advertis-
ing intensity. The findings are consistent with the
strategic view of CPG, in that managers use phil-
anthropic giving as part of the firm’s strategy. Firms
are not purely altruistic when making philanthropic
donations. Instead firms utilize CPG as a marketing
strategy to differentiate themselves from their com-
petitors with the intent to establish firm reputation
and create economic value for shareholders. As a
result, firms with higher advertising intensity are
more likely to donate and donate more. More
interestingly, we find that the positive relationship
between CPG and advertising intensity is stronger in
competitive industries. This suggests that firms
in more competitive industries work harder at
differentiating themselves from their competitors.
This study also finds that firm size, profitability,
geography, cash resources, and leverage are signifi-
cantly associated with the CPG decision. These
TABLE IV
Multiple regression results for tests of the relation between the amount of charitable contribution, advertising intensity,
and industry competition level (All firms)
Donationi ¼ b0 þ b1 Adverti þ b2 HHI ðHHIDÞi þ b3 Advert  HHI ðHHIDÞi þ b4 Sizei
þ b5 ROAi þ b6 Sichuan dummyi þ b7 Cash availablei þ b8 Leverage þ ei
(2)
Reg1 Reg2
Model explanatory power
Number of observations 1,479 1,479
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.224
F-statistic 27.37 27.60
Significance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000
Variables Parameter estimate t-statistic Parameter estimate t-statistic
Intercept -2279.25*** -11.48 -2192.95*** -10.46
Advert 990.62*** 5.01 -901.77 -1.42
HHI 266.08 0.51
Advert*HHI -6778.96** -2.16
HHID -70.80 -0.68
Advert*HHID 1825.04*** 2.76
Size 117.13*** 12.26 107.08*** 12.25
ROA 199.58** 2.47 192.46** 2.39
Sichuan dummy 83.61** 2.15 81.82** 2.11
Cash available 0.025*** 8.31 0.026*** 8.85
Leverage 15.61 0.83 14.32 0.76
Please refer to Table I for variable definitions.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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results are consistent with major findings in the lit-
erature related to other natural disasters such as the
South Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the
Kashmiri earthquake (Crampton and Patten, 2008;
Muller and Whiteman, 2009).
Our findings offer useful implications for future
research. Although the strategy literature (e.g., Fry
et al., 1982) suggests that advertising and charitable
contributions are complementary inputs in devel-
oping the firm’s reputation, this perspective has not
been tested previously in an emerging country. As
there are important differences in cultural, institu-
tional, legal, economic, and ethical backgrounds
between developed and developing countries (Ge
and Thomas, 2007; Lam and Shi, 2008; Whitcomb
et al., 1998), our finding that firms in an emerging
market use CPG as a marketing strategy is an
important contribution to the CPG literature.
Moreover, our finding that industry characteristics
significantly affect the relationship between CPG
and advertising intensity suggests that CPG cannot
be viewed in isolation from other corporate behavior
or the economic environment. It is appropriate in
future research to consider CPG as part of both the
economic and the cultural environments.
Our study also has implications for managers and
governors. In view of rising natural catastrophes in
recent years, corporate philanthropic disaster response
is playing a growing role in helping societies recover
from the disasters. Although governments and other
non-profit organizations are major relief sources,
corporate giving plays a major complementary role.
Our results indicate that firms may not be purely
altruistic when making donations, which is under-
standable because corporations have the objective to
make profits for shareholders. Therefore, the gov-
ernment and its regulatory bodies should consider
designing mechanisms that motivate firms to make
TABLE V
Multiple regression results for tests of the relation between the amount of charitable contribution, advertising intensity,
and industry competition level (givers only)
Donationi ¼ b0 þ b1 Adverti þ b2 HHI ðHHIDÞi þ b3 Advert  HHI ðHHIDÞi þ b4 Sizei
þ b5 ROAi þ b6 Sichuan dummyi þ b7 Cash availablei þ b8 Leverage þ ei
(2)
Reg1 Reg2
Model explanatory power
Number of observations 685 685
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.268
F-statistic 16.60 16.60
Significance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000
Variables Parameter estimate t-statistic Parameter estimate t-statistic
Intercept -3808.83*** -9.75 -3615.43*** -8.04
Advert 1050.98*** 3.19 -2154.37 -1.55
HHI 278.62 0.21
Advert*HHI -10371* -1.77
HHID -171.16 -0.61
Advert*HHID 3092.37*** 2.39
Size 184.41*** 10.78 184.14*** 10.82
ROA 421.33* 1.65 418.29* 1.64
Sichuan dummy 162.31** 2.06 158.84** 2.02
Cash available 0.014*** 3.12 0.015*** 3.60
Leverage -43.85 -0.57 -43.78 -0.58
Please refer to Table I for variable definitions.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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more donations and create a win–win situation for all
related parties.
Although this study sheds new light on CPG, it
has several limitations that may be addressed in fu-
ture research. First, our research focuses only on the
CPG behavior of listed firms in China. While China
is an important emerging market, which provides a
worthwhile research environment, our results may
not generalize to other countries because institu-
tional structure and national culture can affect firms’
CSR behavior (Furrer et al., 2004). Future research
could compare the strategic use of CPG in different
markets to better understand the roles of institutional
structure and national culture. Second, data avail-
ability limited our sample to listed firms, while
nonlisted firms may also donate. Examining the
CPG behavior of nonlisted firms is promising, as
listed firms’ donation decisions may be affected by
investor sentiment in the stock market. Finally,
although we show robust evidence that firms stra-
tegically use CPG, we did not investigate the deci-
sion process and the determinants of the strategic
decision. It would be a fruitful area to investigate
how firms plan their CPG strategies and their
antecedent factors.
Notes
1 Although several articles have discussed the relation-
ship between advertising and provision of CSR (Brown
et al., 2006; Fisman et al., 2006; McWilliams and Sie-
gel, 2000; Navarro, 1988), none of those articles docu-
ment whether charitable donation amounts and the
likelihood of firm response to catastrophic events relate
to firm advertising intensity, and how this relationship
varies with industry competition levels.
2 It was also known as the Wenchuan earthquake,
after the location of the earthquake’s epicenter, Wench-
uan County in Sichuan province.
3 Just 2 days after the 5/12 Sichuan earthquake, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the ‘‘Notice of
Improving Listed Companies’ Social Responsibilities’’
and the ‘‘SSE Guideline on Environmental Information
Disclosure by Listed Companies,’’ which aim to guide
the listed companies to actively fulfill social responsibili-
ties. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the other stock
exchange in China, issued a similar notice in 2006.
These official guidelines also encourage listed firms’
CPG.
4 The official disclosure website for Chinese listed
firms is www.cninfo.com.cn.
5 All financial information for sample companies is
from the most recent annual report preceding the Sich-
uan earthquake.
6 Our advertising expense data are from the Sinofin
database. In China, firms report selling expense in their
income statements and Sinofin provides firms’ financial
data for Chinese listed firms as Compustat does in the
U.S. Selling expense mainly includes advertising expen-
ditures, salesperson salaries, and commissions. All these
fees are related to activities aimed at promoting sales of
merchandise. For example, if a firm uses a TV adver-
tisement to promote its products, then the fee will be
recognized as advertising expenditures. If a firm uses
doorstep selling to promote its products, then the fee
will be recognized as sales salaries. Thus, selling expense
is an appropriate measure of firms’ advertising intensity.
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